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Changing Environmental Practice: 




Since the early 1990s, the environmental management literature has grown from a small 
offshoot of mainstream academic study to become a vibrant field of its own.  The 
contributions of this field lie in the study of corporations and their impact upon the 
natural world. We are impressed by the large quantity of good ideas that have developed 
concerning how to improve the environment in ways that are good for business.  Yet we 
also have observed that many executives and organizations have been slow to adopt wise 
environmental practices.  We offer insight from both behavioral decision research and 
organizational theory to explain the barriers to change, and suggest means of 
surmounting those barriers.  After providing an overview of both the applied and 
academic areas of environmental management, we identify specific barriers to its 
implementation and offer direction for diffusing wise environmental management 






Corporate environmentalism emerged as a movement in the late 1960s.  Since 
then, it has grown and evolved through multiple iterations, driven at times by evocative 
and sensational environmental events such the Cuyahoga River fire, Love Canal, Bhopal, 
Chernobyl, the Exxon Valdez spill, and the Brent Spar controversy.  Conceptions of 
corporate environmentalism as regulatory compliance in the 1970s gave way to newer 
management conceptions of “pollution prevention,” “total quality environmental 
management,” “industrial ecology,” “life cycle analysis,” “sustainable development,” 
“environmental strategy,” “environmental justice,” and others. Media focus on these 
conceptions expanded from air and water in the 1970s to today’s emphasis on hazardous 
waste, remediation, toxics, right-to-know, ozone, global warming, acid rain, solid waste, 
chlorine phase-out, and environmental racism.  With each conception came a more 
complex understanding of the intersection of business activity and environmental 
protection.   
As corporate environmental practice evolved, a new field of academic research 
emerged in the 1980s to understand it, one focused on business decision-making, firm 
behavior and the protection of the natural environment.  Relatively new among the 
management sciences, this area of inquiry addressed the overlap between business 
strategy and environmental protection (i.e., Royston, 1979; 1980).  Now, as we look back 
at nearly twenty-five years of scholarly exploration, it is apparent that this offshoot of 
management research has matured into an area of study in its own right.  But another 
question becomes important as we consider the accomplishments of the field.  How much 
of this intellectual thought is devoted to conversation with other academics and thought 
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leaders, and how much of it is dedicated to engaging practitioners who are dealing with 
change in the professional arena?   
In this article, we argue that environmental management research has much to 
offer practitioners, but that this diffusion has not been as successful as it should be.  In 
contrast, corporate environmental practice has been dominated by the advice of 
economists and lawyers (Stern and Barley, 1996).  We will make the case that 
management scholarship has the unique ability to identify the barriers to the 
implementation of wise environmental management practices and the strategies needed to 
surmount these barriers. We will discuss how corporate environmentalism has emerged 
as a phenomenon in the real world , then consider how management research has 
attempted to address this phenomenon.  Next, we will illustrate how contributions from 
the fields of behavioral decision research and organizational behavior can enrich that 
literature, offering greater insights into the necessary ingredients for wise environmental 
management to make it into practice. 
 
Corporate Environmentalism as an Empirical Domain 
Over the past 100 years, society has witnessed unprecedented economic growth 
and human prosperity.  Our industrial and intellectual pursuits have created a tripling in 
global per capita income (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 1997), 
an increase in average life expectancy of almost two-thirds (World Resources Institute, 
1994), and a populace that is significantly more literate and educated than our 
predecessors (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2002). These 
advancements have all been enabled by industrial sector developments in medicine, 
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materials, transportation, communication, and food production.  Since the 1960s, 
however, society has begun to question some of the commonly held assumptions of 
development, such as the belief that the environment can be treated as an endless source 
of resources and a limitless depository for waste. This questioning has resulted both in 
the recognition of corporate activity as the source of environmental problems, and in the 
more recent recognition that industry can also be a part of the solution.  It is in this area 
that research in managerial decision-making has the most to offer.  
 
Industrial Activity as the Problem   
Between 1960 and 2000, private worldwide consumption expenditures have 
increased fourfold to more than $20 trillion (in 1995 dollars) (Starke, 2004).  To feed this 
consumption, industry consumes vast amounts of material resources at ever-increasing 
rates.  Between 1990 and 2000, the sales of the largest 100 trans-national corporations 
increased 50 percent to $4.8 trillion (World Resources Institute, 2001).  As much as 75 
percent of the annual resources absorbed by industrial economies overall become wastes 
within a year (World Resources Institute, 2000a). This industrial activity has had and will 
continue to have a critical impact on many components of the natural environment.   
Plant and mineral resource depletion. In the 1990s, the global rate of 
deforestation averaged 9 million hectares per year (World Resources Institute, 2001).  
Global wood consumption has risen by 64 percent since 1961.  During this time, half of 
the wood consumed was burned as fuel; meanwhile, commercial logging has cleared 
more than one-fifth of the world's entire tropical forest cover.  Demand for industrial 
wood fiber is projected to rise by between 20 and 40 percent by 2010 (World Resources 
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Institute, 1999).   Significant soil degradation has occurred on as much as 65 percent of 
agricultural land worldwide, reducing the productivity of about 16 percent of that 
cropland, especially in Africa and Central America (World Resources Institute, 2000b).   
Fishery depletion.  Consumption of fish and fishery products (such as fish meal 
and fish oils) rose by 240 percent between 1960 and 2003  (World Resources Institute, 
1999). In 1999, the total global fish catch was 4.8 times higher than it was in 1950. 
During that time, industrial fleets exhausted at least 90 percent of all large ocean 
predators, including tuna, marlin and swordfish (Starke, 2004). Overall, nearly 25 percent 
of the world’s most important marine fish stocks have been depleted or overharvested, or 
are just beginning to recover from overharvesting. Another 44 percent are being fished at 
their biological limit and are therefore vulnerable to depletion (World Resources Institute, 
2000b).  Demand for fish as a food supply is projected to increase by up to 50 percent by 
2010, a level of consumption that cannot be met by current production trends (World 
Resources Institute, 1999). 
Fossil fuel consumption and pollution.  Global consumption of fossil fuels in 
2002 was 4.7 times higher than 1950 levels (Starke, 2004). Worldwide emissions of the 
greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2) reached 23 billion metric tons in 1999; an 8.9 
percent increase since 1990 (World Resources Institute, 2003).  These levels are expected 
to yield changes in global weather patterns as well as increases in sea levels and the 
migration of vector-borne diseases.   
These statistics and many others illustrate how business activities negatively 
impact the natural environment.  As environmental degradation spreads, companies will 
experience more and more pressure to find solutions.   
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Industrial Activity as Solution   
In our increasingly globalized world, the impact of industrial and commercial 
activities has become more vivid and severe. For several reasons, the environmental 
problems that society faces cannot be solved without the involvement of business 
interests (Hoffman, 2005).   
First, business decisions concerning what material, labor and energy inputs to use 
and how to manage product and waste outputs ultimately determine environmental 
quality. Therefore, industry often is directly responsible for environmental problems, and 
is thus most vulnerable to social and political challenges for change.  Second, companies 
are generally the sources of technological evolution within society.  As such, companies 
often best understand the technical tradeoffs that innovation choices may involve. While 
environmentalists and others may appreciate the impact of systemic change, companies 
understand the underlying technical and economic aspects of innovation. Third, 
governments no longer possess the full array of resources and knowledge necessary to 
dictate environmental solutions tocompanies.  Many within policy circles now agree that 
companies must become participants in the environmental regulatory process if 
sustainable and economically efficient solutions are to be found.  Fourth, the power of 
business organizations to determine the structures of social, economic, and political 
activity has grown to such enormous proportions that industry, both individually and 
through markets, now possesses the most resources needed to create more efficient 
coordinating mechanisms. Indeed, businesses have been developing solutions to 
emerging environmental problems with a number of products and services, such as: 
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alternative mobility systems, including gas-electric hybrid vehicles, fuel-cell vehicles, 
and car sharing in urban centers; alternative energy sources including wind energy, fuel 
cells, and micro-turbines; and alternative manufacturing materials, including bio-
materials (to replace fossil-fuel-based fabrics such as nylon, polyester, and lycra) and 
composite woods (to replace large-stock timber.  Fifth, as society demands that 
environmental problems be addressed, companies can earn new profits by finding 
solutions (Hoffman, 2005).   
Clearly, there is a strong logic behind the need for business to play a more active 
role in alleviating environmental crises.  To date, however, the evidence points to a slow 
diffusion of industry-led ideas and actions.  Given that industry will be profoundly 
affected by new environmental protections, there is a great need and opportunity for a 
better understanding of this slow diffusion.  In the next section, we summarize 
management research on the environment and promote a broader perspective. 
 
Corporate Environmentalism as a Management Research Domain  
Scholars within management schools only recently engaged in the empirical 
research domain of corporate environmentalism. One of the first groups of scholars 
interested in business and the environment, the Greening of Industry Network (GIN), was 
formed in 1989. GIN’s international participants argued that “most regulation has not 
been based on a solid understanding of how industrial firms operated” and that future 
advances in environmental policy would require an appreciation of the “intradynamic and 
interdynamic processes” of organizational learning that incorporate an awareness for how 
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“various groups both inside and outside the firm conjointly shape its behavior and 
strategy” (Fischer and Schott, 1993: 372).  
This first initiative to build a research community among management scholars 
was followed by the formation in 1990 of the Management Institute for Environment and 
Business (MEB, now a division of the World Resources Institute) and, in 1994, of the 
Organizations and the Natural Environment (ONE) special-interest group of the Academy 
of Management. To support this burgeoning research area, special issues on organizations 
and the natural environment have appeared in the Academy of Management Review 
(1995), American Behavioral Scientist (1999), the Academy of Management Journal 
(2000), and other publications. Academic journals dedicated to the interface between 
managerial action and environmental protection also emerged in the 1990s, including 
Business Strategy and the Environment and Organization and Environment. 
Much of this research has been normative in focus, focusing on understanding and 
predicting why and how corporations “can take steps forward toward [being] 
environmentally more sustainable” (Starik and Marcus, 2000: 542).  The research has 
identified environmental practices that also make good business sense, yet little of it has 
considered why these good ideas are not put into practice.  For example, early research 
attempted to demonstrate a link between positive environmental performance and 
positive competitive performance. But most of this research has been inconclusive, with 
some studies showing a positive correlation and others showing a negative correlation 
(Margolis and Walsh, 2001).   
Looking deeper for clues about the relationship between business success and 
environmental protection, significant research has addressed the relationship between 
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resources and environmental strategies (Shrivastava, 1995: Hart, 1995, 1996). Other 
research has examined the factors – public policy, market and institutional forces, and 
others – that could favor or retard environmentally beneficial innovation in products and 
production processes, both within and across firms.  In coordinating this network activity, 
some study why certain firms adopt voluntary standards for environmental performance 
(Delmas and Terlaak, 2001; Andrews, et al., 2001; Delmas, 2002) and the phenomena of 
self-regulation (such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the Forest Stewardship 
Council) (Prakash, 2002).  These researchers make the compelling case that it is often 
profitable for companies to be a step ahead of regulations (Lyon and Maxwell, 2004).   
Within such networked structures, there has been a great deal of research into the 
dematerialization of production processes (Roome, 1998), either through the optimization 
of supply-chain logistics for producing goods, the development of more efficient 
manufacturing processes (Weizacker, Lovins and Lovins, 1998), the use of green 
materials and processes, or shifts from products to services in the marketplace (Lovins, 
Lovins and Hawken, 1999) such as leased carpets (Interface) or car sharing (Mobility or 
Zip Car). In each case, researchers argue that the innovation is both good for the 
environment and good business.   
While this research offers important and vital insights, we argue that the 
visionaries who have generated these ideas too often seem to assume that, “If we write 
about it, they will follow.” Extensive research on the diffusion of innovation makes it 
clear that this view is naïve.  We believe that we need to understand the barriers that exist 
to implementation and offer new insights concerning how to put wise insights into 
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practice.  Here, organizational theory and behavioral decision research have much to 
offer (Hoffman, 2004).  
 
Turning Environmental Insights into Practice 
Research in the organizational behavior disciplines focuses on how social and 
psychological processes influence the perception and development of managerial and 
market structures, including managerial and market structures relevant to the natural 
environment.  Organizational behavior's interdisciplinary, multi-level structure makes it 
well suited for addressing the human side of management behaviors with respect to the 
environment.  Organizational behavior research offers multiple lenses for viewing the 
complexities of the intersection of business and the natural environment.  More 
importantly, this research sheds light on tactics that can be used to integrate the insights 
of broader managerial research into practice.   
At the individual level, organizational behavior research offers insights into how 
the social perception and enactment of environmental management issues occurs (i.e. 
Cordano and Frieze, 2000) and, therefore, highlights the fundamental mechanisms by 
which change can be undertaken.  Behavioral research posits that individuals attempt to 
act rationally, but are bounded in their ability to achieve rationality (Simon, 1957; March 
and Simon, 1958).  Armed with four decades of behavioral decision findings, researchers 
now are able to predict, a priori, how people will make decisions that are inconsistent, 
inefficient, and based on normatively irrelevant information.  Individuals rely on 
simplifying strategies, or cognitive heuristics.  While these heuristics are frequently 
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useful shortcuts, they also lead to a wide variety of decision biases (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1973, 1979; Bazerman, 1998).    
At the organizational level, behavioral research views individuals as part of larger 
systems of organizations and institutions (Hoffman, 1999).  It examines the political and 
economic root causes of environmental disruption and develops a systematic approach 
that shows how organizations, institutions, and individuals can both push for and resist 
environmental protection reforms (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994).  It attends to the rise of 
environmental consciousness and social movements, addressing how change occurs 
within social systems and why.  Central to this stream is a consideration of environmental 
risks as they relate to the macro-sociology of social change (Beck, 1992).  The research 
takes a social constructionist approach toward these key themes, focusing on the “social, 
political and cultural processes” by which environmental issues, problems, and solutions 
are given attention and defined (Hannigan, 1995: 30).  
At both the individual and organizational level of analysis, research has much to 
contribute toward the resolution of contemporary problems of practical relevance.  The 
next section will discuss specific ways in which behavioral scholarship can help 
practitioners in policy, business, and non-profit communities put the broader management 
research into practice. 
 
Understanding Cognition that Allows Environmental Degradation   
A great deal of research has examined the patterns of thinking that lead to 
environmental degradation.  In this section, we will highlight one cognitive limitation, the 
mythical fixed pie of negotiation, and end the section with an overview of how other 
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decision biases also negatively affect the environment and keep us from adopting wise 
innovations. 
We begin with the story of Ben Cone, a forester in North Carolina.  When he 
feared that the presence of endangered red-cockaded woodpeckers on his property would 
make him a target of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Cone shifted from a 60-year 
tradition of sustainable forest management to massive clear-cutting of trees (Baden, 
1995).  Clearly, this is not the type of solution intended by the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA), which protected the woodpecker.  Why did Cone destroy his forest?  He assumed 
that any outcome desired by the government would be bad for him — an assumption 
referred to as the mythical fixed pie of negotiation, or the belief that negotiators are 
fighting over a finite pie of resources (Bazerman 1983).  The most common reason 
negotiators fail to find optimal outcomes is that they do not look for tradeoffs that can 
enlarge the pool of resources to be distributed.   
It is important to note that it was not the ESA's implementation that caused Mr. 
Cone's hasty and drastic actions, but rather his misperceptions of it. After the story 
became a touchstone for ESA critics, it was revealed that endangered species 
considerations influenced only 15 percent of Cone's land.  He was free to continue 
thinning trees on the remaining land as he had done for years.  Furthermore, the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service repeatedly offered Cone proposals that would have insulated him 
from future ESA responsibilities.  He refused to cooperate, however, believing that 
whatever the government and environmentalists desired must be bad for his business.  
Cone's fear of the complete economic loss of his assets led him toward a radical 
protective strategy (American Spectator, 1995).  His belief in the win-lose nature of 
13 
endangered species protection guided his unfortunate actions.  We surmise that similar 
beliefs by many protagonists in environmental disputes result in similar dysfunctional 
results. 
Solutions existed to Cone's dilemma.  The ESA provides a framework, in fact, for 
a solution that would satisfy all sides: Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs).  HCPs provide 
the opportunity to enlarge the pie by giving private landowners a permit to violate the 
specifics of the ESA through “incidental taking” of listed species in the course of lawful 
development activities, provided that the landowner follows certain steps to provide for 
conservation of that species.  HCPs can overcome the win-lose mentality by creatively 
developing plans that satisfy both endangered species protection and economic interests.  
It is tempting to assume that if we were in Ben Cone’s position, we would reach 
more sophisticated conclusions.  Yet, prior to the work of Walton and McKersie (1965), 
many brilliant negotiation scholars committed errors similar to Cone’s .  To this date, 
competing perspectives on the relationship between economic competitiveness and 
environmental protection remain part of an active, highly visible debate.  Splitting into 
polarized camps, protagonists argue whether this relationship is inherently “win-lose” or 
“win-win.” Win-lose proponents argue that environmental protection reduces economic 
competitiveness (Walley and Whitehead 1994; Palmer, Oates, Portney 1995).  Win-win 
proponents argue that this framing of the issue is a false dichotomy and that economic 
competitiveness improves through environmental protection (Gore 1992; Porter and van 
der Linde 1995a, 1995b).  These bright thinkers argue for one incomplete process or the 
other, overlooking the symbiotic nature of these alternatives. 
14 
On the win-lose side, Palmer, Oates, and Portney (1995) argue that environmental 
demands “must,” by their very nature, result in reduced profits for the firm.  Walley and 
Whitehead (1994) add that the existence of a win-win, or cost-free, solution to 
environmental problems does not make sense and that any existing euphoria for the win-
win scenario is not only “unrealistic” and “misleading,” but “dangerous.” Fundamentally, 
they state that “ambitious environmental goals have real economic costs.  As a society, 
we may rightly choose those goals despite their costs, but we must do so knowingly.  And 
we must not kid ourselves.  Talk is cheap; environmental efforts are not” (Walley and 
Whitehead 1994: 2-3). 
In contrast, the win-win side believes that environmental gains can complement 
economic objectives: “the costs of addressing environmental regulations can be 
minimized, if not eliminated, through innovation that delivers other competitive benefits” 
to the firm (Porter and van der Linde 1995b: 125).  These authors argue further that 
“emissions are a sign of inefficiency and force a firm to perform non-value creating 
activities such as handling, storage and disposal . . . reducing pollution is often coincident 
with improving the productivity with which resources are used” (Porter and van der 
Linde 1995a: 105).  Gore (1992) adds that “some companies have found that in the 
process of addressing their environmental problems they have been able to improve 
productivity and profitability at the same time . . . an emphasis on environmental 
responsibility makes good business sense” (Gore 1992: 342).  Win-win proponents 
maintain that the key to realizing benefits lies in “a new frame of reference for thinking 
about environmental improvement” (Porter and van der Linde 1995b: 127).   
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The present debate has hardened into an ideological conflict between intractable 
positions.  The negotiations literature teaches us that these contrasting frames of 
reference are not only unnecessarily polarized, but fundamentally incomplete 
(Thompson, 2004). And it offers an alternative model that integrates elements of both 
positions for a more productive outlook on the issue.  Conflict between economics and 
the environment is a mixed-motive situation (Walton and McKersie, 1965); in other 
words, the balancing of environmental and economic interests is neither purely 
cooperative nor purely competitive.  Within this mixed-motive perspective, we argue that 
protagonists on both sides of the environment versus economics debate miss too many 
opportunities to transform the contentious debate into an efficient set of solutions.  That 
is, it would be healthier for protagonists to argue over a more optimal set of possible 
solutions. 
When environmental advocates argue that environmentalism is good business, 
pro-business advocates can too easily point to poor environmental regulations that harm 
profitability.  And when those in the win-lose camp argue their case, those in the win-win 
camp counter with examples of environmentally friendly behavior creating new 
profitability.  The key to resolving this circular debate is the recognition that 
environmentally friendly behaviors are sometimes profit-compatible and sometimes not.  
When parties acknowledge this simple fact, it becomes easier to convince corporations to 
adopt environmental measures that are mutually beneficial. This thinking moves us 
beyond the simple question, “Does it pay to be green?” (King and Lenox, 2001; Margolis 
and Walsh, 2001). Instead, it asks us to consider how and when it pays to be green for 
specific companies in specific circumstances (Howard-Grenville and Hoffman, 2003). 
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Thus far in this section, we have focused on one bias, the mythical fixed-pie, and 
specified what it tells us about how to encourage parties to move beyond their limiting 
mindsets and adopt environmentally friendly ideas.  But many other biases are also 
environmentally dysfunctional.  Positive illusions, self-serving interpretations of fairness, 
and overconfidence are other culprits that explain environmentally destructive behaviors 
(Hoffman et al, 1999).   Similarly, we know that people and organizations tend to overly 
discount the future.  As a result, organizations too often forego upfront capital 
expenditures that would offer huge annual returns.   
Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of the harmful impact of overly high 
discount rates with regards to the future is the global fishing crisis, described earlier in 
this article.  Worldwide, 11 of the 17 largest fishing basins have been destroyed in recent 
decades.  With the aid of high-tech equipment and government subsidies, fishers have 
depleted the oceans of once-plentiful species.   Subsidies for the global fishing fleet have 
helped produce enough boats, hooks, and nets to catch twice the number of available fish. 
Quite simply, too many boats are chasing too few fish, leading to international skirmishes 
over borders and poaching.  In extreme cases, disputes over fishing rights have turned 
violent in recent years: Canadian fishers blockaded a U.S. ferry and shot at a Spanish 
ship, Russians shot at Japanese fishers, Iceland forced a Danish boat from its waters, 
Australian forces have seized Indonesian boats, and the Portuguese Navy fired on a 
Spanish boat.  Economic and social disruption – including the depletion of freshwater 
supplies, environmental pollution, and the exhaustion of natural resources – will become 
increasingly common as the world continues to over-harvest the oceans. 
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Given these woes, why do governments continue to subsidize fish over-
harvesting?  We believe that the psychological tendency to overly discount the future is 
largely to blame.  Political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, and decision 
researchers have offered unique insights into the management of social dilemmas.  Yet 
policy makers have failed to apply these insights to the management of fishery crises 
around the world.  The diffusion of wise environmental practices must include strategies 
for confronting these cognitive obstacles. 
 
Understanding Organizational Biases that Perpetuate Environmental Degradation 
 The adoption of wise innovation is limited not just by cognitive obstacles, but also 
by the ways in which organizations have evolved based on market pressures and adaptive 
organizational responses.  In this section, we focus on one such organizational limitation, 
the over-reliance on regulatory standards.  We conclude the section with an overview of 
how other organizational properties keep us from adopting wise innovations. 
Environmental protection standards are the most apparent source of pressure for 
organizational action in the United States and elsewhere (including, we argue, ineffective 
and counter-productive action).  While recent regulatory innovations have sought 
cooperation between government and industry, businesses continue to perceive regulatory 
pressure largely as coercive in nature, forcing compliance by threat of penalty.  But 
standards are also symbolic, uncertain, contested, and constitutive.  Courts frequently 
measure compliance against “industry standards,” “business necessity,” and “the limits of 
current technology.”  Without overlooking the coercive aspects of standards (Scott, 
1995), we must also consider how they are supported by contending logics of cognitive 
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values and beliefs (Powell, 1996). Edelman (1990), for example, shows how abstract 
coercive legal mandates are typically enacted in organizational practices via mechanisms 
of translation and adaptation based on these supporting cognitive institutions.   
mConsider that the present U.S. environmental regulatory structure is founded on 
fundamental institutional beliefs about the nature of pollution and the appropriate 
methods for eliminating it.  Dating from the formative days of the Environmental 
Protection Agency in 1970, these beliefs contribute to a stable (though at times counter-
productive) policy paradigm.  Three components of this regulatory culture are 
particularly relevant to our discussion. 
First, the regulatory structure is based on a perception of environmental issues as 
compartmentalized by media — air, water, pesticides, radiation, solid waste, etc.  An 
inaccurate framework for understanding the inherently trans-media nature of pollution, 
this conception nonetheless is perpetuated by a formal organizational structure within the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that is an artifact of its early formation.  In 
1970, many advisers to the agency’s first administrator recommended an “intermedium” 
approach that would have regulated an industrial facility as a unit, considering the impact 
of its operations on the environment as a whole. But political realities forced the creation 
of the new agency through the consolidation of existing departments scattered through 
the federal government.  Because these departments were based on media-specific 
mandates, the resultant agency was similarly structured.  This structure institutionalized a 
framework that inhibits creative environmental problem solving by focusing on partial 
and fragmented solutions. 
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A second aspect of the regulatory structure that institutionalizes a particular 
conception of environmental issues is its “command-and-control” format.  Many in 1970 
felt that once the U.S. government set standards and began to enforce them, industry 
would fall in line and environmental problems would essentially disappear (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1993).  During its first 60 days, the EPA took five 
times as many enforcement actions as the agencies it inherited had taken during any 
similar period (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas, 1990).  This focus on punishing polluters 
was justified on political grounds to establish credibility for the EPA, but it also set up 
the adversarial relationship between industry and government that exists today.  This 
adversarial relationship supports the belief that government regulators and industry 
decision-makers cannot find solutions that offer mutual gain. 
Finally, a third aspect of the EPA’s regulatory structure that has institutionalized 
our beliefs about the relationship between economics and the environment is the focus on 
“technological fixes” to environmental problems.  Since the 1970s, regulations have been 
based on prescribed, technology-based standards.  The EPA’s  catchphrase during the 
early 1970s was “technology-forcing,” which describes the strategy of setting new federal 
rules to require industry to use new pollution-free technology;as new plants replaced old, 
the problem of pollution was expected eventually to disappear (Novick, 1986).  Today, 
that mindset is manifested in regulations that prescribe “best demonstrated available 
technology” (BDAT) for specific environmental problems across disparate industries. 
Over time, this (a) media-segmented, (b) command-and-control/adversarial, and 
(c) technology-based approach to environmental regulation came to provide a standard 
approach to understanding the nature of environmental issues, regulatory solutions, and 
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the “inherent” policy tradeoffs among government, industry, and activist communities. 
Some have begun to argue that existing standard and enforcement programs may be the 
biggest challenge faced by environmentalists today.  While they can force behaviors that 
are easily monitored by oversight agencies, they perpetuate perceptions about the 
relationship between economics and the environment that may be contrary to the goals of 
both.   They are based on institutions that perpetuate the view that economic and 
environmental interests are mutually exclusive (Hoffman and Ventresca, 1999). While 
government standards have historically produced results consistent with broad 
environmental objectives (Easterbrook, 1995), many now view this paradigm as out of 
date and overly restrictive of corporate environmental initiatives beyond compliance 
(Schmitt, 1994).  But to change them will require alterations in multiple levels of 
systemic policy structures, individual and collective organizational cultures, and the 
cognitive biases of individual managers.   
Tenbrunsel and colleagues (1997) argue that legal standards lock organizations 
into a focus on strict legal compliance rather than the attainment of environmental goals 
or more subtle societal interests.  They suggest that decision makers may evaluate sub-
optimal choices (both economic and environmental) that better adhere to a standard than 
optimal choices that violate the standard.  Once standards are written, program managers 
within both government and corporations become constrained by a compliance mindset 
and by bureaucratic procedures, which attenuate the search for creative solutions to 
complex environmental problems.  Standards direct attention and embody a theory of 
cause, effect, and solution that is often received as accepted wisdom.  Across a broad 
spectrum of disassociated industries, a given rule structure dictates which pollutants and 
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sources to control, to what extent, and with which technologies.  It often ignores the 
technological and logistical issues associated with overlapping regulatory programs, as 
well as the multi-media and multi-objective impacts of a particular rule of policy (Raffle 
and Mitchell, 1993).  At times, standards can explicitly restrict environmentally optimal 
solutions.  For example, the permitting requirements under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) often restrict hazardous waste recycling initiatives by strictly 
regulating those wastes once they are created.  Any company that creates hazardous 
wastes and then attempts to recycle or reuse them will be required to obtain a “Part B” 
permit for treatment of a hazardous waste, an extremely expensive and time-consuming 
process (Byers, 1991).  In the eyes of many corporate managers, such as Thomas Zosel, 
manager of 3M’s 3P program, “RCRA permits are so extensive and expensive to develop 
that many companies forego recycling to cut all the regulatory hassle required by RCRA” 
(Ember, 1991).   
Tenbrunsel et al. (1997) also suggest a motivational explanation for the 
“misdirected attention” effect, namely that standard-based systems can change the 
incentive systems for individuals and promote self-interested behavior at odds with wider 
societal interests (Tenbrunsel et al., 1997).  Sub-optimal outcomes are the product of both 
unintentional and intentional actions on the part of a decision maker, within the context 
that frames incentives and defines options.  Unintentional actions may result from 
individuals “just following the rules,” creativity not being rewarded, a “use it or lose it” 
rationale, intrinsic motivation being replaced with extrinsic motivation, or a “no law 
against it” mentality.  Intentional actions include trying to “beat the system.”  For 
example, the EPA listed n-methyl pyrrolidone (NMP) in 1995 as one of the chemicals for 
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which industry must report emissions.  NMP is a common replacement in the adhesives 
industry for chlorinated solvents.  It is non-flammable, practically non-volatile, and 80-
90% recyclable.  The listing was prompted by a single study citing a potentially remote 
health effect.  Many companies decided to revert back to flammable and volatile (but 
non-reportable) solvents in order to avoid the reporting burden of NMP.  The end result 
of the NMP listing requirement was a reversion to a less safe and potentially more 
environmentally harmful option. 
As we noted earlier, standards are supported by contending logics and project-
symbolic activity.  To alter the meaning behind environmental standards and the tensions 
that exist between such mandates and the organizational processes (Edelman, 1990; 
Mezias, 1995), we must change both the overt (regulative) and the taken-for-granted 
(cognitive) institutions upon which they are based (Scott, 1995).  In essence, a standard is 
an artifact of the wider regulatory cultures, structures, and traditions from which it 
originates.  But existing cognitive aspects of such standards are anchored in the 
constellation of beliefs, organizational routines, policies, and practices that have 
accumulated over thirty years of organizational and programmatic routines and that have 
defined the nature of environmental problems and the form of their solution.  Breaking 
down such structures will require attention to their regulative aspects, which are 
influenced by direct political control, as well as their cognitive aspects, which perpetuate 
a practical conception of the nature of environmental problems that counterpose 
environmental sense to economic competitiveness.   
Regulatory standards are not the only source of environmentally detrimental 
behavior that has become established within organizations over time.  Multitudes of 
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accompanying organizational arrangements can perpetuate environmentally damaging 
behavior and shield managers from perceiving opportunities to satisfy environmental 
interests to the betterment of the organization.  Organizational silos keep multiple 
elements of organizations from seeing and implementing wise strategies that cut across 
the organization.  Such silos are often based on political divisions and protective 
departmental interests that shield organizations from identifying the potential economic 
benefits of environmental initiatives. Segmented responsibilities within these multiple 
departments can also separate economic cause from environmental effect, thereby leaving 
opportunities on the table (Lovins and Lovins, 1997).  
Capital budgets keep plant managers from making wise long-term decisions 
regarding total lifespan costing of plant equipment.  Capital planning is supported by 
economic metrics that can perpetuate behaviors that damage the environment. For 
example, the gross domestic product (GDP), the foremost indicator of a nation’s 
economic progress, measures of all financial transactions of products and services in the 
country, but does not acknowledge or value a distinction between those transactions that 
add to a country’s well-being and those that actually diminish it (Redefining Progress, 
1996).  Other metrics, such as return on investment, net present value, and return on 
equity, are built upon beliefs and assumptions that overlook measures that include 
environmental concerns. Financial markets, for example, often encourage short-term 
goals, undervalue environmental resources, and discount the future in favor of accounting 
and reporting systems that do not reflect environmental risks and opportunities 
(Schmidheiny, 1996).  Economic return on investment must support the debt load 
expected by lending institutions and corporate investors.  These pressures will lead 
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forestry companies to harvest timber at rates that exceed maximum sustainable yield, 
thereby diminishing the natural capital asset base.  The short-term payback periods of 
financial markets take precedent over the long-term time horizons of ecological systems.   
Coordinating mechanisms within the organization, such as established reward and 
incentives systems, often mask the opportunities available through change. Where a 
company may claim to hold environmental initiatives as important in its mission 
statements, misaligned reward systems can lead individual managers toward fulfilling 
immediate personal goals that diverge from the broader, long-range goals of the 
organization and the environment (Kerr, 1995). Rewards exist on the systemic level as 
well. Architects and engineers are compensated with a percentage of the cost of the 
building or equipment that is specified at construction, not over its lifetime. These 
professionals often are actually penalized for eliminating equipment that may be costly at 
the beginning of the project, but cheaper over the long term. This has led the U.S. 
government to misallocate about $1 trillion to air-conditioning equipment that would not 
have been necessary had the buildings been optimally designed to produce the same or 
better comfort at lower cost (Houghton et al. 1992).  
At the deepest level, certain taken-for-granted assumptions are implanted in 
managers in their earliest education at business schools and then perpetuated through 
managerial structures. These assumptions include: the notion that the firm is socially and 
physically autonomous; the idea that profit motive is the singular objective of the firm; 
the omission of natural capital from market accounting systems; the perception of the 
natural environment as a limitless source of resources and a limitless sink for wastes; and 
the unquestioned necessity of economic growth (Capra, 1982; Daly, 1991; Daly & Cobb, 
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1994; Gladwin et al., 1995).  These assumptions support actions that are detrimental to 
the stability of environmental (and at times, social) systems surrounding the organization.   
Within organizations, the changes needed to help employees overcome these 
biases happen slowly and invite resistance. Resistance can come in the form of habitual 
routines that perpetuate behaviors that employees may know are damaging the 
environment.  Often the perpetuation of habit stems from an individual’s realization that 
changing an established habit will involve some form of short-term costs.  While 
inefficient or inconsistent with long-term objectives, these established routines can 
become familiar, comfortable, and reliably predictable (Clark, 1985). Habitual routines 
often grow out of taken-for-granted engineering or managerial practice.  Fear of the 
unknown can also drive both organizational inertia and the continued reliance on basic 
underlying assumptions.  Both external and internal change can be upsetting for 
organizational constituents, particularly when the outcome or consequences of change 
cannot be predicted.  Of course, in the real world, outcomes or consequences can never 
be predicted.  Resource limitations can restrict the ability of an organization to overcome 
sunk costs of plants, equipment, and personnel.  Sunk costs can become psychological 
roadblocks that prevent managers from adequately addressing demands for change. 
Short-term costs predominate, thus biasing the manager to over-discount the future.  
Finally, threats to established power bases can cause resistance to organizational change.  
Organizational culture establishes a structure of power that will bias the perceptions of 
those whom the existing system benefits.  Any attempts to restructure the system will 
likely undermine these power structures and invite organizational confusion, 
interdepartmental rivalry, or organizational resistance (Mintzberg, 1979).  Self-
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preservation may override concerns for environmental or economic objectives in 
managerial decision-making.   
In summary, organizational arrangements and cultural beliefs tend to perpetuate 
destructive environmental behavior.  Individuals within organizations deviate from 
rational and self-interested behavior through the individual biases discussed in the last 
section, coupled with the organizational-level biases discussed in this section.  
Overcoming these obstacles will require alterations in the organization that integrate 
environmental concerns into the organization’s basic underlying beliefs, recasting them 
in ways that are mutually beneficial to the objectives of the organization and the 
sustainability of the ecosystem on which it depends. 
 
Overcoming Organizational and Psychological Barriers: 
The Endangered Species Act and Habitat Conservation Plans 
Of all environmental legislation in the United States, the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) is the most controversial, seeming to pit the interests of economic development 
against those of environmental protection.  To critics, the idea of giving up jobs and 
hindering a regional economy to save owls sounds absurd; they consider protection of the 
human economy to be paramount.  To proponents, such economic sacrifices are 
unfortunate but necessary to protect the 1,516 species of flora and fauna currently listed 
as threatened or endangered; to them, protection of natural ecosystems is priceless.  This 
is how ESA debates most often play-out.  Economic and development interests form 
intractable positions and fight a distributive, win-lose battle over concessionary 
agreements. 
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The mission of the ESA is to create a mechanism for the U.S. government to 
designate any animal or plant species as “endangered” or “threatened” and prohibit its 
“take” (i.e., any harm to a member of the species or its habitat). For many, the provisions 
of the law represent the most extreme form of coercive, command-and-control legislation 
in the regulatory code. Landowners in particular have viewed the law as overly coercive 
and built on the conception that environmental protection is at odds with economic 
interests (Hoffman and Ventresca, 1999). Simply put, for many, the law appears to be 
structured to take control of private property in order to support a public good (species 
protection). Some environmentalists also believe the ESA was built on the same kind of 
media-segmented approach that permeates other environmental laws.  The law focuses 
particular species in discrete parcel lands instead of on ecosystem protection in 
contiguous and intact pieces of property. 
In an attempt to move beyond these supporting beliefs and the perverse behaviors 
they provoke, Congress amended the ESA in 1982 and introduced Habitat Conservation 
Plans (HCPs) as a mechanism to encourage creative solutions that balance conservation 
and economic imperatives.  HCPs provide an opportunity to break the existing mold of 
coercive command-and-control regulation and to form creative public-private 
partnerships that loosen regulatory strangleholds, enhance long-term regulatory 
predictability and species protection, and improve conservation science and technology. 
HCPs also mitigate the perverse incentives to conceal or destroy evidence of listed 
species on private lands—in the words of one landowner, to “shoot, shovel, and shut up” 
(Crismon, 1998). 
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In technical terms, HCPs permit landowners to engage in “incidental take” of 
protected species when pursuing otherwise lawful commercial activity.  In practical 
terms, HCPs allow landowners to gain greater regulatory flexibility and predictability in 
exchange for a commitment to beyond-compliance species protection on their property. 
In the timber industry in particular, the long (sometimes decades-long) guarantee of an 
HCP is essential to commercial forest management. But in spite of the opportunities that 
voluntary programs such as HCPs present, key economic and environmental stakeholders 
have been slow to adopt this radical shift in regulatory relations (Hoffman, Riley, Troast 
and Bazerman, 2002). By viewing HCPs through the lens of behavioral scholarship, we 
can assess how this form of regulation can help overcome some of the obstacles to 
adoption we identified earlier, and highlight how new forms of resistance emerge (Troast 
et al., 2002). 
In the first ten years of the HCPs’ existence (from 1982 to 1991), only 12 HCP 
plans were approved by the federal government (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1999).  
There are many reasons for this institutional resistance:  
1. Resource constraints. The responsible federal agencies have been 
understaffed and constrained by limited resources (e.g., for site visits, 
scientific review, program development, etc.).  
2. Fear of the unknown.  Most companies affected by the ESA know little 
about the HCP process, and many prefer the “devil they know” in 
command-and-control regulations to the “devil they don’t know.”  
3. Threats to political interests and a fixed pie perpective.  Poised for battle 
with commercial interests, environmental activists have condemned HCPs 
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as overly permissive and fundamentally flawed in their long-term design 
(Sabel, Fung and Karkkainen, 1999); industry interests view them as yet 
another costly web of government bureaucracy .  
4. Habitual distrust.  All parties possess a degree of historic, ingrained 
distrust for others in this negotiation process.  
To overcome some of this resistance, the Department of Interior introduced the 
"No Surprises" policy in 1991, reassuring private landowners that the government would 
stand by the terms of any HCP negotiated.  This policy stimulated the adoption of HCPs. 
By the end of 1997, there were 243 HCP agreements in 16 states, covering 6.2 million 
acres of land.  But while the shift from command-and-control implementation of the ESA 
to the negotiated implementation of HCPs brought about many creative new efforts, the 
number of HCPs was much smaller than the number of conflicts in which an HCP could 
have been used as a tool to generate a better solution for landowners and the 
environment. 
Returning to the theme of this article, why were HCPs underused, despite their 
potential to create value for all parties through wise trades?  We argue that organizational 
and cognitive barriers explain this contradiction.  Had the creators of HCPs considered 
these barriers, far more of them could have beennegotiated.  First, despite the potential of 
HCPs to enlarge the pie and create value for landowners and environmental interests, 
many parties continued to view their conflicts as win-lose and zero-sum, adopting the 
view that “If it’s good for the other side, it can’t be good for me.”  In addition, the branch 
of government that created the HCP legislation did not give the government employees in 
charge of implementation the budget or the skills needed to effectively implement HCPs.  
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The government employees charged with negotiating HCPs were overworked and were 
not trained to negotiate against wealthy landowners who could heavily finance their 
negotiations.  Collectively, HCPs represent an excellent prototype of an environmental 
innovation that was limited by cognitive and organizational barriers (see Troast et al., 
2002 for a more detailed analysis). 
 
Conclusion 
The field of environmental management has made great strides in the past quarter-
century, building a body of research and literature that can help us understand and 
improve environmental performance within corporations.  Yet much can be done to bring 
this research into the realm of practice and change corporate environmental behavior for 
the better. Tremendous opportunities for making wise environmental changes lie ahead of 
us; the low-hanging fruit remains.   
To bring about wise changes, we must confront the barriers to corporate 
implementation.   As an issue of corporate concern, environmental protection has become 
much more complex and requires a more sophisticated view to be managed effectively. 
This is an area to which organizational research can contribute. Organizational research 
attends to the psychological and organizational sources of environmentally damaging 
behavior and helps us identify solutions through alternations in systemic control 
structures and individual interests and biases (Winn and Angell, 2000).  Research on 
decision making and organizational theory has implications for managers who now 
recognize that, to improve global environmental conditions, they need to understand how 
to change the behavior of business.  In addition, policy-makers need to understand how to 
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incorporate business thinking into policy development to foster the most effective and 
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